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Recent economic upheavals raise important questions about the nature of the 
transformation that has taken place in the East Asian economics. Are these 
economics really catching up with the West? Is there growth process sustainable? Or 
will they suffer the type of systemic disintegration experienced by the East European 
countries during the 1990s—Paul Krugman  (1994) and Young (1994) had 
demonstrated similarities in the East Asian and East European growth paths some 
time ago. 
Technological upgrading is an important element in the development of a 
sustainable growth strategy. This paper seeks to describe policies and initiatives 
taken by the South Korean government to stimulate technological learning during 
1960–1990—the decades during which the South Korean economy achieved a 
“miraculous” transformation. The description relics mainly on Korean sources and is 
based on our own field research in that country. 
Section one describes the technological learning processes and Section Two 
presents a discussion of the policies that facilitated this learning. Section Three 
briefly addresses the question: Did this type of technological learning make a 
contribution towards enhancing the sustainability of Korean development processes? 
The concluding section briefly reflects on the lessons that seem relevant for Pakistan. 
 
I.  ESTIMATING TECHNOLOGICAL LEARNING 
IN SOUTH KOREA 
The South Korean “miracle” may be summarised in one simple statistic. 
Income per capita has risen from about $90 in 1960 to over $10,000 in 1995 [ROC 
(1997)].
1 When General Park Chung Hee come to power in the early 1960s, South  
Korea was one of the world’s most backward economies ridden with corruption and 
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regarded as virtually ungovernable. Today, South Korea has one of the most 
diversified manufacturing sectors and manufacturing value added growth has 
usually been in double figures on a annual basis during most of the last three 
decades [UNIDO (1997)]. Exports have increased from $40 million in 1962 to 
over $125 billion in 1995. The export profile has changed dramatically over this 
period. In the 1960s, South Korea exported textiles, clothing plywood, toys and 
wigs. In the 1970s, the major exports were steel, ships, construction services, and 
consumer electronics. By the mid 1980s computers, semi conductor memory 
chips, electronic switching systems, automobiles and turn key industrial plants 
had begun to dominate South Korean exports. Today Korean firms are 
internationally competitive in multi media electronics, high-density televisions, 
personal communication systems, and nuclear breeders. By 1994 South Korea 
ranked second in the world in terms of consumer electronics and steel, third in 
semi conductor memory chips, fifth in chemical fibres and petrochemicals and 
sixth in iron and steel and automobiles [KDB (1995)]. Such impressive results 
reflected rapid growth in technological capabilities. 
Table 1 presents estimates of machinery and equipment per worker at 
constant prices for 28 manufacturing sectors in South Korea.
2 Over the 1960–
1990 period the real value of capital employed per worker has tripled with the 
most rapid growth being concentrated in non electrical machinery, electrical 
machinery, transport equipment, non ferrous metals, fabricated metals and glass 
producing branches. Differences in the growth of physical capital stock per 
worker is quite marked between the capital and non capital goods branches— 
both consumer goods and intermediates lag significantly behind the capital 
goods sectors. Within these groups, glass, pottery, footwear and beverages have 
high investment growth rates. Variations in levels of physical investment have 
led to changes in the structure of industrial production and the share of the 
capital goods branches (JSIC 381 to 385) in manufacturing value added now 
exceeds 43 percent [UNIDO (1997)]. It was below 10 percent in 1965. 
Physical capacity building during 1963–1990 was accompanied by rapid build up 
of human capital. The number of R and D performing institutes rose from 87 in 1964 
(almost all in the public sector) to over 2000 in 1990—over 80 percent funded by private 
enterprises. Total R and D expenditure rose from Won 1.2 billion in 1963 to Won 33.5 
trillion in 1990 with a private sector share of over 80 percent in that year. During 1960s 
however, the private sector share of R and D expenditure had been about 15 percent on 
an annual average basis. Human capability building was thus clearly sponsored by the 
state at the start of the industrialisation period. 
Table 2 reports the distribution of research personnel in South Korea in 1988. 
Over 60 percent off these were engineers and 41 percent of  engineering   researchers 
2Data presented in this section roughly cover the three decades (1960–1990) during which the 
decisive transformation of the South Korean economy was achieved. Difference in data sources however, 
does not allow a strict adherence to these terminal dates in all tabulations. Technological Capability Building in South Korea  37:4, 827
Table 1 
Machinery and Equipment Stock per Worker  
(in 1985 Constant Thousand Won) 
   1963  1970  1980  1990 
Index (1963 =100) 
1990 
1. Food    1978  1707  3851  9889  500 
2. Beverages    1360  1342  5938  21262  1563 
3. Tobacco    2139  2645  2803  24872  1162 
4. Textiles  2362  2394  5400  12710  538 
5. Apparel  853  511  857  1137  133 
6. Leather    941  1606  3145  4205  447 
7.  Footwear  380 804 2986  16141  2373 
8. Wood  2991  1696  2945  4433  148 
9. Furniture    375  400  760  1997  532 
10. Paper    3942  4250  7027  14506  368 
11. Publishing    2149  2110  4927  7133  332 
12. Ind.  Chem.  30688  17340  19204  59378  193 
13. Other  Chem.  1005  1437  4886  13147  1308 
14. Petrol  Ref.  –  21937  80375  53268  242 
15.  Petro and Coal  911  1825  3613  9588  1050 
16. Rubber  1303  1485  2692  2997  230 
17. Plastic    7789  2034  3452  5772  74 
18.  Pottery    143 239 1668  4319  3020 
19.  Glass  162 218 4792  8783  5421 
20. Non-Metal  Min.  7839  6298  12220  33867  432 
21. Iron  and  Steel  5880  6644  28665  61688  1049 
22. Non-Ferr.  3679  5791  12719  19091  5189 
23. Fabricated  Metal  1421  1377  4128  5874  4133 
24. Machinery    1706  2618  10000  15371  9009 
25. Elect.  Mach.  2100  1648  52167  12417  5784 




1779 1036  1243  387  22 
28.  Other    840 350 1726  3040  362 
 Total    3916  3499  7525  12132  310 
Source: Hark K. Pyo A Synthetic Estimate of the National Wealth of Korea 1953–1990 KDI Working 
Paper No. 9212 Seoul 1992 and UNIDO data base. Ansari and Khan  37:4, 828
Table 2 
Researchers By Field of Science and Degree in South Korea, 1990 
Field of Science  Total  Doctor  Master  Bachelor  Others 
Total    56545 13419 17374 24240  1512 
Natural  Science    8665 3691 2664 2277  33 
Mathematics    1157  621 341 193  2 
Physics  1584  708 454 410  2 
Chemistry    3004  1004 834 1153  13 
Earth  Space  445 236 126  81  0 
Biology    1371  732 375 259  5 
Others    1104  389 528 181  11 
Engineering    34153 4432  9545 19150 1026 
Machine, Ship and 
Airplane  8876 748 1970  5783 375 
Materials  2660 596  819 1217  28 
Electricity and 
Electronics   11993 990  3381 7232  390 
Chemical    4208 632 1035  2469  81 
Food and Genetic   1518  325  483  695  15 
Textile    667 116 179 353  25 
Atom  300 94 129 77  0 
Natural  Resources 196  80 58 55  3 
Construction    2144  558 833 692  61 
Others    1591  293 664 586  48 
Medical, 
Pharmaceutical  6673 3342 2308  978  45 
Medical    4574 2814 1270  489  1 
Pharmaceutical    1020  367 288 364  1 
Health and Nurse  888  123  667  79  19 
Others    191  38 83 46 24 
Agricultural, Forestry,   
Fishery  4415 1576 1487 1161  191 
Agriculture and Forest   3861  1450  1293  983  135 
Agricultural and Forest   3000  1101  1050  728  121 
Animal and Dairy   599  228  160  200  11 
Others   262  121  83  55  3 
Fishery and Ocean   554  126  194  178  56 
Others    2639 378 1370 674  217 
Source:  Ministry of Science and Technology and Korea Industrial Research Institute, Major Indicators of 
Industrial Technology. Seoul August (1990),  p.131. Technological Capability Building in South Korea  37:4, 829
held post graduate degrees. Personnel involved in natural sciences represented 
15 percent of the total, almost three quarters of these held post graduate 
degrees. The number of mathematics and physics specialists was hover low, 
about 5 percent of the total number of researchers. This illustrates the relative 
neglect of research and the strong emphasis placed on technology adoption and 
application. 
This bias towards adoption and learning rather than creation and 
innovation is also evident in figures produced by the Ministry of Trade and the 
Ministry of Science and Technology on patents and technology imports during 
1963 to 1990. The value of capital goods imported has risen from $172 million 
in 1966 to $25.5 billion in 1990. Patents granted within South Korea have 
grown at a much more modest rate from about 390 in 1969 to a little over 7500 
in 1990. Moreover, even in 1990, Korea nationals received only about 30 
percent of the patent approvals [Kim (1995)]. It is thus not innovation but 
“reverse” engineering which has been the main channel for technological 
upgrading in South Korea.
3   
But developing technological adoption capabilities has required a repaid 
growth of human skills. Investment in human skills as measured by educational 
and training expenditure by households and the government exceeded physical 
investment by 48 percent in 1969— i.e. at an early stage of the industrialisation 
process [Chang (1997)]. This compares with a human to physical investment 
ratio of only 43.5 percent in the United States in 1929 [Schlitz (1972)]. As Table 
3 shows the share of junior and full college graduates in South Korean industry 
rose from 5 percent in 1973 to 15.8 percent in 1992. The share of unskilled 
workers fell from 44 percent to 7 percent during this period. The share of college 
graduates in South Korean adult population has increased from 5.4 percent in 
1980 to 12 percent in 1990 and is expected to approach 20 percent by 2000 [Park 
(1988)]—one of the highest ratios in the world. Over the period 1965–1985 there 
was persistent excess of the supply of college graduates, relative to demand yet 
during the 1970s and 1980s the average wages of collage graduates (at entry 
level) were usually more than double that of high school graduates [Kim (1990)]. 
In 1960, engineering and natural science entrants in tertiary institutions 
accounted for 27.8 percent of the total student in take. By 1990 this ratio had 
risen to 39.2 percent [Lim (1995)].
4 
 
3In South Korea this has taken the form of obtaining un-packaged technology components 
from many sources and assembling mainly in technology packages owned by large manufacturing 
firms (the chaebels) to suit local requirements.    
4Separate figures on management specialists are not available. These are included in the 
social science category in the data prepared by the ministry of education. Ansari and Khan  37:4, 830
Table 3 
Proportion of Educated Workers Acquiring Employment in 

















1973  100  44 35 16 0.9  4.1 
1974  100  41 36 18 1.1  4.3 
1975  100  36 40 19 1.1  4.4 
1976  100  32 42 19 1.2  5.2 
1977  100  30 40 22 1.3  5.9 
1978  100 28.1 42.7 22.1  1.3  5.7 
1980  100 22.6 46.4 23.0  1.7  6.0 
1981  100 18.8 45.1 26.5  1.9  7.6 
1982  100 16.9 44.4 31.1  2.5  5.0 
1983  100 13.5 44.4 34.1  2.8  5.1 
1984  100 12.2 43.3 37.1  2.8  4.5 
1985  100  10.7 42 39.5 2.9 5.0 
1986  100 8.9 37.2  35.4 3.2  5.2 
1987  100 8.5 34.4  47.6 3.6  5.7 
1988  100 7.3 32.3  50.1 3.9  6.3 
1989  100 7.2 28.3  50.9 4.8  8.7 
1990  100 7.6 25.4  52.7 5.5  8.6 
1991  100 7.6 22.2  53.9 6.4  9.6 
1992  100 7.2 20.5  56.3 6.3  9.5 
Source:  Korea Statistical Yearbook (annual 1977–1993). 
 
Heavy investment in physical and human capital has been accompanied by 
growth in total productivity. Lim (1995) estimates total factor productivity growth 
rates for 19 manufacturing branches for the period 1960 – 1985 (divided into four 
sub periods). Total factor productivity grew at an annual average rate of 5.8 percent 
per annum during the entire period (an impressive rate of growth but significantly 
lower than the rate of growth of the physical and human capital stock). TPF growth 
was highest during 1966 – 1970 averaging 15.3 percent per annum. TPF growth has 
averaged about 5 percent during 1975–1985 and was negative during 1970–1975 
when South Korea was severely affected by the oil crises. It is interesting to note that 
there is no systematic association between physical investment growth and the 
growth of TPF across industries. Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient for 
industrial branches ranked according to physical capital growth on the one hand and 
TPF growth on the other is only 0.41 in 1985. Intermediate and consumer goods 
branches such as chemicals, rubber, furniture, tobacco and printing which had low 
physical investment growth had relatively high TPF growth during 1965–1985. 
Moreover, Lim’s evidence shows a decline in TPF growth in several capital goods Technological Capability Building in South Korea  37:4, 831
branches during 1980–1985 compared to the earlier five year periods. Branches 
experiencing TPF growth decline include metal products, electrical and non 
electrical machinery and transport equipment. On the other hand, consumer branches 
such as leather, wood, furniture, paper and printing have experienced strong TPF 
growth during 1970–1985. 
Kim and Cho (1989) have presented estimates of R and D “Capital stock” in 
South Korean manufacturing during 1977-1986. This was estimated on the basis of 
expenditure on machinery and equipment, rates and land service charges and 
payments of research personnel. They show that: 
  1. During the 10-year period, the total R and D capital stock in the 
manufacturing sector grew over 5 fold (or approximately at an annual 
average growth rate of 17.5 percent). The growth rate for machinery and 
equipment sectors (ISIC 38) dominated with an 8-fold increase and also in 
terms of absolute volume. The chemicals and plastics sector followed in 
terms of growth rate and absolute amount. 
  2. Domestic R and D expenditure exceeded spending on technology imports 
by a factor of 2. This seems to suggest that although the core technology 
unavailable at home has been imported, efforts were made to minimise 
imported content of the total technology package. Domestic R and D 
efforts supplemented technology import s as much as possible. The 
proportion of domestic R and D shows even a greater dominance in the 
traditional sectors such as the food-processing sector, with 90 percent in 
1986 and the textile and clothing sector with 83.7 percent. Presumably, the 
latter sectors seem to have achieved technological capabilities close to the 
best practice abroad by the end of the period. 
The overall picture that emerges shows: 
  1. Capability building took place at an unusually rapid rate in South Korea in 
terms of both physical and human capital. Physical capital growth was 
mainly concentrated in the non-intermediate heavy industries. R and D 
expenditure also grew rapidly and was increasingly financed by large 
private sector conglomerates moving into the capital goods branches. 
  2. Human capital growth probably outpaced the growth of physical capital. 
South Korea began her industrialisation era with a high ratio of human to 
capital expenditure and human skills were continuously upgraded so that 
the level of skills in industrial employment rose continuously during the 
period. Demand of skilled labour also grew rapidly and graduate 
unemployment had effectively been eliminated by 1985. 
  3.  Technology capability building in South Korea has been achieved 
primarily by the growth of the physical and human capital stock. The rate 
of total factor productivity growth has been significantly lower than that of Ansari and Khan  37:4, 832
the stock of (physical and human) capital stock. There is no evidence that 
manufacturing branches in which investment growth has been 
concentrated have enjoyed above average TPF growth. Nor is there 
evidence of across the board TPF growth acceleration during the 1980s.   
  4. While R and D expenditure and technological accumulation, remains high 
technological dependence on imports has been reduced mainly in the 
consumer goods branches. In the capital goods branches technological 
import as a proportion of R and D capital stock have not declined 
significantly. Indeed Kim and Cho (1989) show that the ratio of imported 
technology to R and D stock rose in the Machine and Equipment branch 
(ISIC 38) from 24 percent in 1977 to 33 percent in 1986. This suggest that 
domestic substitution of technological imports has become increasing 
difficulty over the years.    
 
II.  GOVERNMENT POLICIES FOR CAPACITY BUILDING 
The South Korean government has sought to enhance technological capacity 
building by influencing both demand and supply related factors. Demand side policy 
creates market needs for technological upgrading. Major instruments used for this 
purpose were (a) export policy and (b) imposed crises on the corporate sector. 
Export policy centred on the annual setting of very ambitious export targets at 
a branch and firm level. Firms had to constantly undergo a life and death struggle to 
regularly meet these targets and the acquisition of efficient technologies became 
necessary for firm survival. Exporters had to make large lump sum investments for 
capacity building far more than local market size. Exploiting economies of scale and 
scope was thus structured into the investment  strategies of Korean firms which were 
focussed on expending shares in international markets. Korean firms also had to 
build close relationship with international buyer groups. Marketing of Korean 
manufacture products was effectively monopolised by foreign buyer groups, which 
developed a stake in Korean export successes. These foreign buyer groups provided 
invaluable help to Koran firms in acquiring technological capabilities through 
interactive tutorial processes and allowed Korean firms to focus their efforts 
primarily on acquiring productive capability [Chio (1994)]. The buyer groups had 
however a relatively short time horizon and did not encourage innovation and basic 
research in South Korea. 
Early on in the industrialisation process the government recognised the need 
to encourage the growth of large industrial conglomerates the famous chaebols many 
of which owe their existence to acquiring on very favourable terms Japanese 
property seized by the Korean government in the late 1940s. Many chaebols have 
now developed into multinationals and they have played a crucial role in technology 
acquisition and upgrading. Up to the late 1970s the chaebols  remained heavily 
dependent on Japanese SMEs for components production specially in the electronics Technological Capability Building in South Korea  37:4, 833
and automobile branches but since 1979 the government began actively promoting 
technology based Korean SMEs. These efforts have however not been particularly 
successful and the Korean SME sector lags significantly behind those of Taiwan and 
Japan. Process innovation has been seriously hampered by this lack of depth in the 
Korean industrial sector. 
Deliberate crisis imposition on the corporate sector has not remained confined 
to the setting of export targets. A crises was imposed on the corporate sector when $ 
12.7 billion were invested during 1973 –1979 for the creation of heavy and chemical 
industries (HCI) primarily for the purpose of creating a self-reliant national defence 
capability.
5 The steel, petrochemical, heavy machinery, shipbuilding, industrial 
electronics and non ferrous metals industries were built up on a crash programme 
and by the late 1990s most of these industries had matured and showed significant 
improvements in EPRs and comparative cost indices [Lee (1997)] enabling Korean 
firms to make a breakthrough in many technology intensive international markets. 
The rapid growth of HCI created crises of technological learning for the 
chaebols. Lacking capability initially they had to rapidly upgrade technology 
assimilation capacity in the areas of plant construction and commissioning. 
Technological learning became essential for survival. The automobile industry was 
forced by the government to shift rapidly from knocked down assembly of foreign 
cars to the development of totally locally designed cars. [Kim (1998).] 
In the electronics industry, the Korean government released an ambitious 
Long-term Electronic Industry Promotion Plan. The government was determined to 
promote the industry as a leading exporter. In 1969, when the industry was still 
exporting at the level of a mere $ 42 million, the government set the goal for exports 
at $ 400 million for 1976 (the last year of the Plant). The government’s export drive 
not only set specific export goals and directives that forced local firms to be 
competitive in both price and quality in the international markets, it also provided 
incentives that compelled local firms to acquire technological capability quickly. In 
1976, exports exceeded $ 1 billion, indicating the rapid learning in production and 
product design that the industry accomplished. 
Overall it took only fifteen years for the ratio of value added in light industries 
over HCVIs to fall from four one in Korea; whereas, the same shift took twenty-five 
years in Japan and fifty years in the U.S. [Watnabe (1985)]. This rapid growth of 
technological capability was also sustained by several supply side measures and 
policies. The share of education in the budget  rose from 2.5 percent in 1951 to over 
17 percent by 1966. Government expenditures, however, accounted for only one-
third of the total expenditures in education, the remainder being borne by the private 
sector, reflecting the high commitment for education within Korean society. Out of 
eight industrialised countries and two NICs, this commitment was the strongest in 
5The South Korean government became acutely conscious of the need for this in the wake of 
American military defeats in Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam during 1968–1975. Ansari and Khan  37:4, 834
Korea [Porter (1990)]. Enrolment at the various levels of the formal education 
system increased rapidly from 1953 and reached the level of the advanced counties 
by 1980. As a result, the illiteracy rate dropped from 78 percent in 1945 to 27.9 
percent by 1960, to 10.6 percent by 1970 and to an insignificant level by 1980 
[McGuin (1980)]. 
South Korea suffered from a very serious problem of brain drain during the 
1950s and 1960s. As of 1967, 96.7 percent of Korean scientists and 87.7 percent of 
engineers educated abroad remained there, mainly in the U.S., compared with the 
corresponding comparisons of 35 and 30.2 percent for all counties [Kim (1997)], 
they, however, became important sources of an overseas technical network and a 
high calibre manpower pool for Korea’s subsequent development. 
The first systematic government efforts to repatriate Korean scientists and 
engineers from abroad began in 1966 when the government established the Korean 
Institute of Science and Technology (KIST) as the first government research institute 
(GRI). The nature of state involvement was “directive” rather than “promotional” in 
orientation. The government vigorously pursued the repatriation of experienced 
scientists and engineers with a highly attractive compensation package, a significant 
departure from the administrative culture of Korea where the literate-bureaucrats 
historically exerted power over technicians [Yoon (1992)]. The state-led repatriation 
programme was quite successful, as few returnees went back to advanced countries. 
The programme also served as a model for the private sector.
6 
Throughout the period, the government actively discouraged the use of 
foreign licensing and foreign direct investment as means for technology acquisition. 
It forced firms to acquire unpakged technology from several sources and assimilate it 
in local production processes [Kim (1985)]. This allowed Korean firms to maintain 
management and technological independence of individual multinationals at least 
during the early stages of industrial development.
7 
Technological upgrading has been facilitated by the proliferation and later 
amalgamation of government research institutes  (GREs).
8 The government has made 
these institutes the major instruments  in various National R and D programmes. The 
most ambitious national R and D programme was the Highly Advanced National 
(HAN) R and D project, also known as the G-7 project, which was aimed at lifting 
Korea’s technological  capability to the level of the G-7 countries by the year 2020. 
The main concern of the government has been to enhance research and technology 
6As noted above graduate over supply was eliminated only to the mid 1980s. 
7Tight control of FDI is reflected in the fact that Korea’s stock of FDI in 1983 was only 7 percent 
of that in Brazil, 23 percent of that in Singapore, and less than a half of that in Taiwan, and Hong Kong. 
The proportion of FDI to total external borrowing was only 6.1 percent in Korea compared with 91.9 
percent in Singapore, 45 percent in Taiwan, and 21.8 percent in Brazil [KEB (1987)]. FDI’s contribution 
to the growth of GNP in Korea in the 1972–1980 period amounted only to 1.3 percent, while its 
contribution to total and manufacturing value added was only 1.1 percent and 4.8 percent respectively in 
1971 and 4.5 percent and 14.2 percent, respectively, in 1980 [Cha (1983)]. 
8South Korean universities are mainly teaching bodies and not research oriented.  Technological Capability Building in South Korea  37:4, 835
development by the chaebols and generous incentives and preferential financing
9 has 
been provided for this purpose. The private sector’s share in national R and D 
expenditure has gone up from 2 percent in 1963 to 81 percent by 1995. Total R and 
D expenditure is now about 3 percent of South Korea’s GNP [Kim (1997)]. 
The rapid speed of technological accumulation seems consistent with the 
dominant themes of industrialisation policies during the past three decades. First, “the 
growth first” objective, coupled with the goal of achieving competitiveness in 
international markets, compelled private enterprises to learn to develop new products, 
new production processes etc. the government encouraged them to import “state of the 
art” technologies rather than second-hand, labour intensive, “appropriate” technologies, 
and also to reach the maximum engineering-determined output capacity in the shortest 
time of learning and mastering rather than maximising short run profit. This strategy 
was applied to all investment projects launched under the Heavy and Chemical 
Industry Development Programme during the 1970s. This strategy stems from the logic 
of “learning by doing by imitating, by training” rather than from the logic of achieving 
the static, allocative equilibrium paradigm.
10  But the emphases on rapid output 
expansion inevitably led to a downgrading of process innovation and basic research.
11 
Second, besides the encouragement provided by various forms of incentive 
schemes, the fierce competition among chaebol groups, must be noted. This 
competitive nature created a rivalry for technological progress. Broadly speaking, 
Korean chaebols imitated the behaviour of Zaibatsus in Japan. It cannot be over-
emphasised that competition has been a critical driving force for rapid growth, based 
on learning of new technology in Korea. 
Policy initiatives thus played an important role in technological upgrading in 
South Korea. The government has used institutional, trade, fiscal, credit and capacity 
building measures carefully targeted at national champion firms which have been 
induced and enabled gradually to take over the government’s technology building 
role.
12 But has the technological accumulation that occurred been sufficient to ensure 
the sustainability of Korea’s development process? 
 
III.  THE ISSUE OF SUSTAINABILITY 
The recent upheavals in the East Asian currency and capital markets have 
shown that South Korea too is vulnerable to international shocks. In terms of GDP 
growth, South Korea’s performance was superior to most other East Asian countries 
9Preferential financing amounted to W. 671.6 billion in 1987 accounting for 94.3 percent of total 
cooperate R and D financing funded by the government. In contrast, direct R and D subsidies by the 
government accounted for only 4 percent of the total R and D expenditure and direct investment through 
venture capital firms accounted for 1.7 percent. The impact of concessional financing, however, may be 
overstated. With rates on preferential loans ranging between 6.5 percent and 15 percent, they conferred 
little advantage over financing available in the international market [KITA (1994)]. 
10During the same period net capital stock grew by about 3 times. 
11Sec Kim (1998). 
12As noted above private investments are financing over 80 percent of R and D expenditure in 
South Korea.  Ansari and Khan  37:4, 836
during the 1970s and 1980s except China. In 1990–96, Korea ranked behind China 
and Hong Kong in terms of annual average rates of GDP growth. In terms of export 
performance South Korea lead during the 1960s and 1970s and was second only to 
Hong Kong in the 1980s. In 1990–1996 South Korean exports grew at an annual 
average rate of over 11 percent but China, Hong Kong and Singapore enjoyed 
significantly higher export growth. (UNIDO data based). 
South Korea grew at the rate of 6.8 percent during 1996 and was then expected 
to register 6 percent GDP growth rate during 1997. Inflation during 1997 ran at about 3 
percent and international reserves were stable at $34 billion during most of 1996 and 
1997 [FER (1997)]. The South Korean economy was the 11th largest economy in the 
world in terms of GDP in 1995 and the country was the 12th largest trader [World 
Bank (1997)].
13 Exports have grown by 6 percent during 1996–1997 and the current 
account deficit to GDP ratio was below 3 percent.
14 The debt servicing to GDP ratio 
was estimated at about 5.3 percent in mid 1997.
15 South Korean fundamentals thus 
looked sound from a medium term perspective in early 1997. 
Nevertheless South Korea has been seriously affected by the financial crisis in 
East and South East Asia. The trade GDP ratio stands at over sixty percent reflecting 
a high degree of exposure to international shocks [World Bank (1997)]. As in East 
Europe the experience with policy, liberalisation has been unsavoury leading to 
increased financial vulnerability. A series of corporate failures during 1996 and 1997 
created severe problems for the banking sector. Foreign portfolio investors who 
during 1997 accounted for about 10 percent of shares on the Seoul Stock Exchange 
are estimated to have withdrawn over a billion dollars during the second half of 
1997. The won depreciated by about 50 percent during 1996–97.
16 Major industrial 
conglomerates were heavily leveraged and the corporate sector had to service 
between $60 to $70 billion worth of external debt every year. The collapse of major 
chaebol groups have created bad debts of between 25 to 30 trillion won for the 
Korean banks.
17  External borrowing has become extremely expensive and credit 
ratings of major Korean financial institutions and debt instruments have been 
downgraded.
18 Domestic interest rates have gone up as have bank portfolio infection 
13These rankings are likely to have been significantly affected by the major devaluation of the 
Won during 1997. 
14As compared to 4.6 percent at end 1996. 
15Again this might be an under-estimate due to the rapid devaluation of the Won. 
16The fixed exchange regime was abandoned in 1990 and a managed float introduced. The foreign 
exchange market was still controlled in 1997. All onshore trading of the Won had to be backed by real 
economic transactions like settlements of import bills, and offshore trading was effectively nonexistent. 
17Major Chaebol groups which have gone bankrupt in 1997 including Hambo, Sammi, Jinro, 
Dianong, Sacngbongwood, Kia, Tael Media and New Cor. 
18To hold Korea Development Banks’ global bonds, which have the same credit rating as Korean 
government debt, New York traders were in late 1997 demanding US. Treaty yields, plus 350 points (3.5 
percentage points) or more, treating them basically as junk bonds. And Exim Bank in 1997 shelved a $350 
million Eurobond issue when investors demanded Libor (the London interbank offered rate) plus 250 
basis points. The inflated spreads reflect an “Asia premium” on top of a “Korea premium”. Technological Capability Building in South Korea  37:4, 837
ratios.
19 
Several authors have over the years identified an important weakness of South 
Korean industrial structure. Manufactured sector growth in South Korea—as in the 
other Asian tiger economics—has been primarily a consequence of factor 
accumulation—rise in labour participation, improvement in educational levels and 
rapid physical accumulation of capital stock. Total factor productivity growth has 
been surprisingly low. According to Young’s (1994) estimates annual total factor 
productivity growth during 1960–85 averaged 1.4 percent for South Korea.
20 Lau 
and Kim (1992) using a significantly more sophisticated econometric model found 
that productivity growth in the East Asian economies, including South Korea during 
1968–1986 was not significantly different from zero. Young’s own subsequent 
econometric work using primary data sources and much more rigorous procedures 
produced total factor productivity growth rates of 1.6 percent per annum for South 
Korean manufacturing during 1966–1980 [Young (1994b)]. Labour productivity 
growth has been significantly higher in South Korea than in other developing 
countries
21—but this is not due to increase in labour efficiency but to an increase in 
the physical capital to labour ratio. This has been made possible by very heavy 
borrowing of Korean chaebols from international markets.
22 
High international indebtedness (particularly of the corporate sector) and low 
total factor productivity growth are two important structural weaknesses of South 
Korean industry. This has led Krugman (1994) to stress the similarities between East 
European and East Asian industrialisation processes in a much-quoted paper. 
Krugman’s main argument is that growth based on expansion of inputs (rather than 
growth in output per unit of input) is unsustainable in the long run—there are 
insurmountable upper limits to increases in investment to GDP ratios, labour 
participation rates and in the share of highly qualified employees in the total labour 
19Authors’ interviews in May 1997. 
20Young’s (1994) estimates of total factor productivity growth rare crude. He uses data for 118 
countries provided by Summers and Heston (1990) cumulating investment flows for ten years (1960–
1969). Using a 6 percent depreciation rate provides a benchmark capital stock for each economy in 1970; 
which can then be extended to 1985 using the investment date for 1970–1985. Using the Summers and 
Heston data on output and number of workers then allows for a cross-sectional regression of the growth of 
output per worker (1970–1985) on a constant and the growth of capital per worker (1970–1985). 
 
Qi–Li = –0.2140.45 (Ki – Li) + Ei 
 
Where Ei, the residual for each economy, represents a measure of the growth of total factor productivity 
(over and above the world average) in that economy. Clearly, this procedure is fraught with error. In 
particular, since technical change induces capital accumulation the coefficient on capital per worker will 
tend to overstate the elasticity of output with respect to capital input. Recall that Lim (1985) estimated an 
annual average TPF growth rate of 5.8 percent for Korean manufacturing during 1960–1985. 
21Labour productivity measured in terms of output per worker in the manufacturing sector grew at 
the rate of 7.3 percent annum in South Korea during 1970–90, as against a corresponding rate of growth of 
4.1 percent in Taiwan 2.8 percent in Singapore, 5 percent in Thailand and 2.6 percent in India [Young 
(1994a) Table 4]. 
22As noted above corporate debt now exceeds $60 million. Ansari and Khan  37:4, 838
force—the Soviet Union reached these limits in the mid 1960s, South Korea may be 
reaching them now. On the other hand, in countries such as China and the United 
States where productivity growth (and not increase in inputs) is the main source of 
output growth these limits are irrelevant. Growth is self-sustaining in the sense that 
limits to efficiency growth are as yet undiscovered. Moreover environmental 
constraints are likely to be more significant in the case of input sourced growth—
productivity led growth is often of a physical resource conserving character. 
It would of course be unrealistic to make a direct comparison between the 
experience of East Europe and East Asian countries Lau (1992), find no apparent 
convergence between the technologies employed in East Asia and in the West. This 
data relates however to an earlier period and since then (1985) Korean technological 
capabilities may have significantly increased as evidenced by the changing 
commodity composition of its exports. Lee (1997) has produced estimates of 
changes in effective protection rates and in comparative cost indices
23 for 23 
manufacturing sectors over the period 1970 to 1990 and shows that all high 
technology manufacturing branches with the sole exception of transport equipment 
had matured or were tending to maturity during this period and were becoming 
internationally competitive.
24 This does not imply of course that the technological 
dependence of these branches on imports had been reduced. 
This is not the place to review the extensive literature on the relative 
effectiveness of industrial policies produced in Korea in the wake of the World 
Bank’s “miracle” report (1993)
25 since its focus is on macroeconomic impact and 
competitiveness and not on technological learning. The Heavy and Chemical 
Industry (HCI) development initiative in response to the 1973 crisis is regarded by 
most Korean economic analysts as decisive in achieving technological 
transformation
26 reflected in a major shift in the composition of Korea’s 
manufactured exports. Will the government be able to take a similar initiative to 
reverse policy liberalisation and achieve technological upgrading through creating 
another “crisis of learning” at the level of the firm? Or has “globalisation” in the 
words of Dani Rodrik “gone too far” and the South Korean state like the Russian 
23Defined as 
       Ci(t) = (1 + ERPi(t))/(1 + ERPa(t))  
Where  
  Ci(t) = comparative cost index of industry i at year t,  
  ERPi(t) = effective rate  of protection for industry i at year t, 
  ERPa(t) =  effective rate of protection for the whole (traded goods) industry. 
 I  =  1,2,-,-,-,29  (industrial  branches). 
 
Ci(t) measure the relative departure of value added in domestic market prices from value added in 
world  market prices between an industry and the whole (traded goods) sector. The smaller Ci(t) is, the 
stronger the comparative advantage, and if larger than one, there is comparative disadvantage. 
24See also Lee (1996). 
25For a good review see Kwon (1994) and Wade (1995). 
26See e.g. Kim (1998) Kim (1995). Technological Capability Building in South Korea  37:4, 839
Federation—and the USSR under Gorbachev—now become subservient to 
international capital? If that is, the case Korea’s permanent relegation from the first 
division of world industrial powers cannot be ruled out. 
The policy capability of the state is measured by its ability to tax capital. In an 
incisive analysis Rodrik (1997) has shown that an increase in openness (which 
Rodrik measures by a proxy for the cost of moving capital abroad L) makes capital 
more responsive to changes in international prices and correspondingly magnifies 
macro economic fluctuations at home. Increased openness reflects a fall in the cost 
of moving capital abroad—a declining. L Past a certain threshold, value of L the 
government loses its ability to effectively tax capital. When this happens the fiscal 
and monetary policies of the concerned country may no longer be regarded as 
autonomously determined—they are endogenised within the systems that generate 
“globalised” factor and product prices. In the World Bank’s favoured phrase, the 
economic policies of such a country are effectively “locked in”. 
It is clear that the December 1997 agreement with the IMF has committed 
Korea to increasing capital mobility (reducing L) but has the critical L threshold 
been reached and the Korean State effectively subordinated to international financial 
markets? If this is the case—and there are some pointers in this direction
27—one may 
expect a slowing down of the growth of technological learning. This will be an effect 
of (a) a switch of investment from high to low technology intensive branches in 
which Korea has a higher comparative advantage (b) an abandonment of long term 
ambitious investments by the chaebols (c) reduction in government spending and (d) 
a dismantling of the sector and firm specific incentives and policy initiatives which 
sustained technological learning in the past. 
While the unfolding of such a scenario is not inevitable it seems increasingly 
likely. What are the lessons to be learnt from these episodes by developing 
countries? 
 
IV.  LESSONS FOR PAKISTAN 
In March 1998, an important study on Building Pakistan’s Technological 
Competence was prepared for the Pakistan 2010, long term perspective project. The 
study discussed South Korea’s technological development in some detail with a view 
to assessing its relevance for Pakistan. 
The analysis of the Korean case (P 18-21.34) does not discuss the limitation of 
the Korean technology strategy—it regards it as an unqualified success. This is 
attributed to. 
27The autonomy of the South Korea State had been underwritten by its military alliance with the 
United States since 1953. Today relations are increasingly strained as the US peruses a dialogue with 
North Korea and seeks to use trade measures to restrict South Korean exports to American markets. The 
tolerance America displayed for Korean state interventionist  policies  my well now be a thing of the post 
see Cha (1997). Ansari and Khan  37:4, 840
  i.  Creating large trading companies at an early stage of development.  
  ii.  Targeting key lists of imported components for domestic production.  
  iii.  Application of strict licensing tax and credit polices. 
  iv.  Maintenance of close liaison between the public and private sectors. 
  v.  Promoting industrial concentration in high technology sectors. 
  vi.  Implementation of large national projects.  
 vii.  Reliance  on  multinationals for technology imports. 
According to the Report “the government has maintained its ability to guide 
the private sector by successfully operating its own research labs” (p. 34). The 
success of this strategy is reflected in the assessment of the report to the effect that 
“this powerhouse economy (of) East Asian show(ed) that the catching up process 
(with the West) can be more rapid than anyone imagined (p. 11). 
But in its policy recommendations for Pakistan almost all these features of the 
Korean experience are ignored. Instead the focus is on market orientation. Suggested 
implementation mechanisms are specifically designed to by pass the existing 
bureaucracy (p. 1). The proposed cluster councils are to be dominated by the private 
sector and are to account for a larger and larger proportion of the national technology 
budget (p. 2). Pakistani firms are to become more sophisticated consumers of 
internationally available technologies. Pakistani firms and research institutes cannot 
afford the “luxury of basic research (for) science does not create wealth. It occurs far 
from market forces” (p. 5). Technology acquisition must be market driven. 
The report rejects the standard dictionary definition of innovation which is “to 
bring in new methods and ideas” It restricts “innovation” to the “successful 
application of technology the opening absorbing and diffusion of technology by an 
organisation” (p. 5) International technology is seen as “footloose” (p. 7) and 
Pakistani firms should be part of the international procurement system. Market 
incentives should not be displaced by government directives (p. 10) MNC 
subsidiaries are seen as important sources for technology development and university 
based centres of excellence should be linked to MNC subsidiaries. 
The report does not recognise the deceleration of world out put and trade 
growth during the 1990s. [UNIDO (1997)] (it says “world trade has attained new 
heights”) (p. 15) nor the slowdown in technology transfer created by the 
implementation of TRIPS and TRIMS. It advocates rapid compliance with TRIPS 
and other WTO regulation (p. 101). It advocates an incrementalist approach towards 
technologies upgrading and explicitly rejects a “big push” approach and the 
undertaking of large national projects (p. 114). There is in this perspective certainly 
no room for genuine technological innovation (defined as the development of new 
methods and techniques) Pakistani firms and research institutes are “expected to play 
a role not in developing but in the selection and implementation of appropriate 
technologies” (p. 114) Pakistani firms should rely on foreign consultants because 
“they cannot afford to have their own R and D departments “(p. 114) research Technological Capability Building in South Korea  37:4, 841
institutes should become market oriented and competitive (p. 116) Cluster councils 
should be based on existing successful groupings such as surgical instruments, 
textiles, leather and establish operational priorities of the Research Institutes (p. 
117). Focus should be on clusters which increase exports. Technology development 
should be driven by the need to raise export competitiveness (p. 119) Net working 
with international firms should be improved (p. 121). 
South Korean technological development was not market driven but it did rely 
on acquisition from foreign sources with the primary concern being the development 
of export competitiveness. 
South Korean technological progress had suffered from three major 
weaknesses. 
  (i)  Neglect of innovating (as against imitation and adoption). 
  (ii) Accepting subordination to the marketing strategies of international buyer 
groups. 
  (iii)  Lack of interaction between the Chaebels and small and medium 
enterprises. 
The Korean strategy of relying exclusively on technology repackaging meant that 
R and D effort was concentrated exclusively on process replication and imitation. While 
as pointed out above, this is a cost effective approach at the early stages of industrial 
development capacity must also be created for fostering basic research and  product and 
process innovation. Pakistan must therefore complement the technology upgrading 
efforts of profit oriented enterprises by establishment of centres of technological 
excellence specialising in innovation and basic research in key area. This is necessary to 
reduce technological dependence of the type that developed in South Korea. 
Equally important is the need to develop an independent market capacity in 
both domestic and intentional markets. Export orientedness especially if dependence 
on the market strategy of major buyer groups is institutionalised creates a bais 
against undertaking long term research and process innovation. An independent 
marketing strategy targeting major market is thus important. 
Finally, technological sustainability requires the creation of industrial depth. 
This requires vertical integration of production, technology transfer and marketing 
structures of large and small enterprises an area in which very limited progress was 
made in South Korea sustainable technological development strategy requires that 
special emphasis be laid on strengthening organisational linkages between large and 
small enterprises especially in the  manufacturing sector.   
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